As we pass the one-year mark for the Great Recession this much is clear: the financial correction of 2008 was only a preliminary event to the slow-rolling crisis that followed. Whether or not it has been a true crisis, that has been the implication of federal officials (administrators, regulators, and elected representatives) scrambling to “take charge” with a cascade of government spending, lending, borrowing, and planning. For those of us working our ways through it, the sense of crisis has been heightened by the expansion of government authority to regulate and control private enterprises, or even to take over those enterprises from defaulted owners.

The recession itself is no longer a concern, apparently, but the remedies (and their effects) are. “Even though from a technical perspective the recession is very likely over at this point, it is still going to feel like a very weak economy for some time as many people still find their job security and their employment status is not what they wish it was,” Federal Reserve Bank chairman Ben Bernanke testified last month.

“It will take a while to get through this, and it will take us longer because we're going to do it right,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner offered in a hearing examining the $700-billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, the first injection of federal money to bailout the banking sector.

Though it may be sufficient for the chairman and the secretary to maintain a “technical perspective,” millions of individuals have stopped trying to understand the past and still have ample reason to worry about what comes next. I don't question their understanding of the problems, but I'm eager to know what these officials and other authorities who “took charge” during this period are doing to lessen the crisis atmosphere they've fostered?

For example: the level of unemployment is 9.8 percent at this writing, nearly 10 percent of all eligible workers, and 5.4 percent above the most recent peak of unemployment. Worse, if the total of available workers today were equal to the pre-recession number, unemployment would be at 11.7 percent.

For more than a decade businesses have been graded on “productivity,” i.e., how well they return the capital invested in them. Facing a recession, businesses sought productivity by cutting every cost, not sparing workers. Even businesses now back on the growth track have no confidence about hiring workers, leaving that grim result — a “jobless” recovery.

Or, this: the centerpiece of the economic recovery strategy has been a $787-billion stimulus program, intended to ignite manufacturing activity. The broader logic is that domestic manufacturers suffer versus foreign competitors' cheaper output, so strengthening domestic companies will revive the sector, its wage earners, and a vast supply chain.

But, ultimately it's impossible for manufacturers to compete globally if their products (and assets) are denominated in dwindling dollars. So much money has been made available by federal spending and low interest rates that every dollar has less value.

Nor is it only manufacturers who suffer from cheap currency. The money in every pocket loses value steadily because federal policies meant to encourage consumer activity are more actively driving up prices. Consumers have no confidence to spend or invest because there is no financial stability. We have inflation, but little appreciation.

Finally, the ongoing “crisis” is fueled by the urgency of federal officials to assert unprecedented authority over economic matters. In that sense, the consumers' lack of confidence is countered by too much confidence on the part of administrators and regulators, confidence that they can manage or guide the activities of individuals, toward prosperity. Correcting that imbalance would be the greatest effort toward overall recovery.